NIOSH Report on the LODD of Chicago FD Captain Herbie Johnson On November 2, 2012, a 54-year-old male career captain sustained injuries while responding to a fire at a 2-1/2 story apartment building and later died in the hospital. The incident occurred just blocks from his own fire station. Battalion Chief 19 (BC19) was the first to arrive and reported heavy smoke coming from both the front and rear of the attic. While BC19 surveyed the interior of both floors, the victim, along with a firefighter from Engine 123, stretched a 2½-inch line with a gated wye to a 1¾-inch hoseline to the second floor. BC19 radioed the captain from the rear of the first-floor apartment, indicating heavy fire in the covered porch and stairwell. The captain and firefighter moved toward the rear of the second-floor apartment. Before water could be applied, the captain told the firefighter they needed to "get out." Engine 49 had positioned itself down the alley to the rear and prepared to apply water through the attic window. The captain moved halfway back into the hallway toward the kitchen and called for help. As the firefighter dragged him toward the kitchen, other firefighters on the second floor heard the captain and firefighter collapse. A Mayday was called by the Squad 5 Lieutenant, and the victim was carried down to the front yard. He responded to basic life support and was transported to Ambulance 19 for advanced care. At the hospital, he experienced complications during airway management and ultimately passed away. Per department procedures, the following companies were dispatched to the initial report of this structure fire through the time of the Mayday: Still Alarm An approximate timeline summarizing the significant events in this incident is listed below. The times are approximate (rounded to the nearest minute) and were obtained from dispatch records, witness statements, run sheets, and fire department records. This timeline is not intended as a formal record of events, but rather as a summary of key moments related to the fatal incident. Note: This department uses the following terminology to designate the sides of a structure: Sector 1 – front of the building, address side, or where “Command†is located; Sector 2 – left side of Sector 1 (clockwise); Sector 3 – rear of the building or opposite of Sector 1; Sector 4 – right side of Sector 1 when facing Sector 1. On November 2, 2012, a 54-year-old male career captain sustained injuries at a 2-1/2 story apartment fire and later died at the hospital. At 1716 hours, dispatch received a Still alarm for smoke in the area. Battalion Chief 19, who was just blocks away, was the first to respond. He approached the fire structure from behind, circled around to the front, and arrived on scene at 1717 hours. He reported a working fire with heavy smoke coming from the rear (Sector 3) and front (Sector 1) of the attic. According to standard operating procedures, dispatch initiated a RIT response. At 1718 hours, E123 arrived on scene, and BC19 had already assumed command. The IC spoke with an occupant who said everyone had evacuated. The IC entered the building through the front door and surveyed the second floor, noticing only a light haze and a glow near the Sector 3 door to the covered porch. He returned to the front door and met the E123 captain (victim) and a firefighter (pipeman). They had laid a horseshoe load consisting of 100 feet of 2½-inch hose, a gated wye, and 150 feet of 1¾-inch hose to the second floor, which was standard for this type of occupancy. At 1720 hours, E49, T33, and TL39 arrived on scene (see Diagram 1). The IC entered the first-floor apartment and worked his way to Sector 3, opening the back door to the covered porch and noticing heavy fire in the covered porch and rear stairwell area (see Photo 2). At 1721 hours, the victim and firefighter were on the second floor, flaking out, charging, and advancing the hoseline toward the rear door of the apartment. The E49 crew had stretched a 2½-inch hoseline down the alley to Sector 3. The T33 crew set up a ground ladder on Sector 2, and TL39 positioned its aerial on the roof about a third of the way back on Sector 2. A TL39 firefighter went to Sector 3 to check doors. He first tried the basement door, which he couldn’t force open, then the first-floor exterior porch door, which was unlocked. He noticed fire lighting up in the stairwell, kicked in the locked door to the first-floor apartment, saw no fire, and backed out. At 1723 hours, the IC radioed the victim about the heavy fire in the covered porch and attic and informed E49 to apply water to the fire around the Sector 3 attic window. There was no response from the victim. E49 proceeded to apply water to Sector 3. The IC returned to the front and donned his turnout gear. The TL39 lieutenant, the SQ5 lieutenant and two firefighters, and a E123 firefighter/paramedic (FF/PM) were near the kitchen on the second floor when they heard a loud commotion. The FF/PM heard the victim yell “get out of here†(see Photo 3 and Photo 4). The FF/PM felt the victim’s air cylinder and noticed it was hot. He also felt a mask dangling and thought it was the victim’s, but it turned out to be the E123 pipeman, who was tangled with the victim. Note: The E123 pipeman was on air, and his facepiece became dislodged while assisting the victim. The FF/PM had no radio and couldn’t locate the victim’s radio, so he yelled Mayday as he tried to untangle the victim and the other crew member. The TL39 lieutenant and SQ5 firefighters heard the FF/PM’s verbal Mayday and the SQ5 lieutenant attempted to transmit a Mayday over heavy radio traffic (see Diagram 2). Note: The victim’s hoseline in the hallway (see Diagram 2) had burst, but it is believed to have occurred during the thermal incident or after the event. At 1727 hours, the TL39 crew had just completed the first hole in the roof on Sector 4, with minimal fire showing, when they heard the Mayday. The IC confirmed a firefighter was down, called a Mayday, and requested a 2-11 Assignment. Dispatch initiated a 2-11 alarm. SQ5 and other members on the second floor grabbed the victim and brought him down the stairs. The TL39 crew, with assistance from a T33 and SQ5 firefighter, had just completed a second hole on Sector 4 when conditions worsened. At 1729 hours, the roof ventilation crew was back in the aerial basket when they noticed the victim being brought out to the front yard. The victim was unresponsive and CPR was successfully performed. The IC met the A19 crew and escorted them to the victim. The revived victim was responsive and talking to the paramedics as he was loaded into the ambulance. At 1738 hours, the victim was transported to the local hospital, where he had complications during airway management and eventually passed away. According to the arson investigator's report, the fire originated in the attic and was accidental in nature. It is unclear how long the fire had been burning before residents on the second floor noticed it in the enclosed rear porch. Smoke pouring out of the attic (indicating an advanced stage of fire) was observed by someone at the street corner west of the structure. That person ran up and knocked on the door to alert the residents, who immediately exited the building. The developing fire in the attic void space was ventilation limited, producing a large volume of unburned products of incomplete combustion and high pressure. First arriving crews observed optically dark smoke from the 2-1/2 story apartment building coming from the front and rear attic windows. As the engine crew advanced a hoseline to the second floor, BC19 searched the first floor and went to the rear of the structure, noticing fire in the enclosed rear porch area. Another engine crew advanced a hoseline down the back alley to the exterior rear of the structure. Once the second-floor rear porch door failed, the fire gases from the porch flowed into the hallway. Indicators of significant fire behavior Note: The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is developing a computerized fire model to aid in reconstructing the events of the fire. When completed, this model will be available at the NIST website: http://www.nist.gov/fire/. Occupational injuries and fatalities often result from one or more contributing factors or key events in a larger sequence of events leading to the injury or fatality. NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that led to the fatality: According to the medical examiner, the victim’s cause of death was inhalation injuries sustained during the structure fire. Thanks Chris Suzhou Sikor Industry Co., Ltd. , https://www.sikor-group.com
Career Captain Sustains Injuries at a 2-1/2 Story Apartment Fire then Dies at Hospital – Illinois
Executive Summary
Contributing Factors
Key Recommendations
Engine 123 (E123): Captain (victim), engineer, 3 firefighters
Tower Ladder 39 (TL39): Lieutenant, driver, 2 firefighters – Note: The company was one firefighter short, referred to as a variance.
Engine 49 (E49): Lieutenant, engineer, 2 firefighters – Note: Also on a variance.
Truck 33 (T33): Captain, driver, 3 firefighters
Battalion Chief 19 (BC19): Incident Commander (IC)
RIT Alarm
Truck 52 (T52): Lieutenant, driver, 3 firefighters
Squad 5 (SQ5): Lieutenant and five firefighters – Note: A squad consists of one heavy rescue vehicle and a 55-foot Snorkel; staffing includes an officer and three firefighters on the heavy rescue vehicle and two on the Snorkel.
Battalion Chief 15 (BC15): RIT Chief
Ambulance 19 (A19): 2 Paramedics
Unit 455: EMS Field Officer
Unit 273: Command VanTimeline
Dispatch for a Still Alarm for “Smoke in the areaâ€: E123, TL39, E49, T33, BC19. BC19 assumes command en route, confirms a working fire, and dispatch initiates RIT response by sending T52, SQ5, BC15, A19, 455 EMS Officer, and Command Van 273.
E123, E49, TL39, and T33 en route; BC19 arrives on scene in under a minute and enters the structure to assess the situation.
E123 arrives on scene.
E49, T33, and TL39 arrive on scene and report black smoke from the front attic window and heavy smoke and flames in the rear.
E123 crew enters with a 1¾-inch hoseline to the second floor. E49 pulls a 2½-inch hoseline down the alley to Sector 3. T33 sets up a ground ladder on Sector 2. TL39 positions its aerial on the roof. A firefighter from SQ5 and T33 assists TL39. About 30 seconds later, a TL39 firefighter enters the first-floor exterior porch door, notices fire in the stairwell, kicks in the mud room door, and backs out to Sector 3.
The IC radios the victim about heavy fire in the rear stairway and covered porch, and tells E49 to put water on the fire from Sector 3. No reply is heard from the victim.
E49 applies water to the fire at the attic window in Sector 3 using a 2½-inch hoseline.
SQ5 makes entry on Sector 1.
TL39 completes the first hole in the roof on Sector 4. After hearing a Mayday over the radio from the SQ5 Lieutenant, the IC calls “Mayday†and requests a 2-11 Assignment. Dispatch initiates a 2-11 alarm.
The IC runs to get A19’s crew.
Firefighters carry the victim outside to Sector 1 and perform CPR.
A19 enroute to the hospital with the victim.Investigation
Fire Behavior
Contributing Factors
Cause of Death